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Paid child support for a college student? Receive a credit for money spent on room and board.

On Behalf of The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nivin, P.C. 

In the Matter of Marina B. Brandt, appellant,

v

Robert A. Peirce, respondent.

D’Agostino Law Office, P.C., Pleasantville, N.Y. (Joseph Rizzo of counsel), for appellant.

Daniel Lawrence Pagano, Yorktown Heights, N.Y., for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Michelle I. Schauer, J.), dated December 3, 2014. The order denied the mother’s objection to an order of that court (Esther R. Furman, S.M.), dated October 23, 2014, which determined that the father was owed a child support credit in the amount of $12,800.

ORDERED that the order dated December 3, 2014, is affirmed, with costs.

The parties entered into a stipulation of settlement that was incorporated but not merged into their judgment of divorce dated July 14, 2008. The separation agreement required that the father pay child support to the mother in the sum of $2,800 each month for the parties’ two children. The separation agreement also provided that the children’s anticipated college expenses would be paid for, after any grants, awards, or scholarships, with specified custodial “529 accounts” that had been “established by the ather” for the children’s benefit prior to the parties’ divorce (hereinafter the 529 accounts). In the event that the 529 accounts were insufficient to cover the children’s college expenses, the father would then use a specified money market account, designated as the father’s separate property, to cover the costs. In the event all of the above accounts were not enough to cover the entire cost of the children’s college expenses, the parties would split the remaining college expenses equally. The separation agreement also stated in a separate paragraph that the father would receive a “dollar for dollar credit” in child support for “every dollar he spends” on the “hildren’s college, room and board.”

The parties’ son went away to college in the fall of 2011. The father paid his college tuition and room and board expenses for the 2011-2012 academic year in full from the 529 account established by the father for the benefit of the son. The father also decreased his monthly child support payments to the mother at this time.

The mother filed a petition for enforcement of the parties’ separation agreement, claiming that the father should pay the full $2,800 per month in child support. The father moved for summary judgment determining that he was entitled to child support credits. He argued that he properly decreased his child support payments pursuant to the grant to him of a child support credit in the separation agreement because he paid the son’s college expenses from the son’s account. The mother opposed the father’s motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on her petition. She argued that the crediting language in the separation agreement applied only to property expressly identified in the separation agreement as the father’s “separate property,” and was not intended to apply to the 529 accounts. The Support Magistrate agreed with the mother, and granted her cross motion for summary judgment in an order dated January 4, 2013. The father filed an objection to the order of the Support Magistrate, which the mother opposed. Upon review, in an order dated February 28, 2014, the Family Court granted the father’s objection, agreeing with his contention that he was entitled to the child support credit, and remitted the matter to the Support Magistrate for further proceedings.

Upon remittal, in an order dated October 23, 2014, the Support Magistrate determined that the father was owed a child support credit in the amount of $12,800. The mother filed an objection to this order. In an order dated December 3, 2014, the Family Court denied the mother’s objection. The mother appeals from the order dated December 3, 2014, and her sole argument on appeal is that the Family Court erred in determining that the separation agreement provided for the father to receive a child support credit for payments he made for the son’s college expenses from the son’s account.

We agree with the father that the Family Court properly determined that he was entitled to a child support credit for payments that he made for the son’s college expenses from the 529 account. A separation agreement incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce “is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation” (Matter of Bokor v Markel, 104 AD3d 683, 683; see Matter of Gravlin v Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 5; Matter of Tammone v Tammone, 94 AD3d 1131, 1133). In interpreting a separation agreement, ” he words and phrases used in an agreement must be given their plain meaning so as to define the rights of the parties’” (Matter of Bokor v Markel, 104 AD3d at 683, quoting Matter of Tillim v Fuks, 221 AD2d 642, 643; accord Eckman v Eckman, 123 AD3d 969, 970). ” Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used’” (Salinger v Salinger, 125 AD3d 747, 748, quoting Ayers v Ayers, 92 AD3d 623, 624). ” ourts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing’” (Willsey v Gjuraj, 65 AD3d 1228, 1230, quoting Henrich v Phazar Antenna Corp., 33 AD3d 864, 867; accord Matter of Tammone v Tammone, 94 AD3d at 1133).

The parties’ separation agreement provides that “he father will receive a dollar for dollar credit in Child Support for every dollar he spends on the Children’s college, room and board.” The plain and natural meaning of the parties’ words entitles the father to the credit for “every dollar” that the father “spends” on the children’s college, room, and board, without limitation (see Salinger v Salinger, 125 AD3d at 748; Matter of Bokor v Markel, 104 AD3d at 683). The question presented here is whether the father “spends” money on the children’s college expenses when the payments are made from the 529 accounts. The mother contends that the separation agreement was not intended to provide for a child support credit under these circumstances because the agreement did not designate the 529 accounts as the father’s “separate property.” Despite the lack of this express designation, however, the parties do not dispute that the father is listed as the owner of the 529 accounts and that he received the money used to fund it as an individual inheritance from his late brother, thereby constituting his separate property (see Overton v Overton, 118 AD3d 858, 858-859). Under these circumstances, where the father paid for the son’s college expenses from the 529 account that the father set up and funded with his inherited money, the father is “spending” money on the son’s college expenses and is entitled to a child support credit in accordance with the plain meaning of the separation agreement.

The father’s remaining contentions are without merit.

MASTRO, J.P., BALKIN, SGROI and MALTESE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court

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Joseph Nivin quoted in story about New York’s indigent defense program

On Behalf of The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nivin, P.C. The New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services plays an important role in the Family Court system. Through this panel, low-income individuals in Family Court can be represented by experienced attorneys, even if they cannot afford it. Tens of thousands of people benefit from this service. But the 18-B indigent defense program is in the midst of a crisis. Lawyers are opting to leave the program, which is now coping with a shortfall. Nivin: It’s ‘exhausting and very, very difficult’ Law 360 recently wrote a story detailing the root cause of this deterioration. The position, funded by taxpayers, pays anywhere from $60-$75 an hour. That rate has not changed in more than fifteen years. It pales in comparison to the compensation federal panel attorneys on noncapital cases receive. This limited pay rate has put many attorneys in a bind. They want to help, but they simply cannot afford it. Coupled with the increasing and often-complex workload, lawyers are simply pivoting elsewhere. Joseph Nivin, of The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nivin, P.C., used to be an 18-B lawyer in Queens. He spoke to Law 360 about the issues facing the program, saying that while the trial experience is “great,” the job is often frustrating. Nivin explained that the caseload often meant he did not have sufficient time for clients, and said it is “exhausting and very, very difficult to pay for an office and an assistant on $75 an hour.” There is presently no way for the Family Court to provide representation to indigent litigants without the 18-B panel. State law requires New York City to pay for legal representation for people who can not. Leaders, however, will likely need to devise a solution if they want to slow down the ongoing attorney exodus.

The Jurisprudence of Parental Alienation

On Behalf of The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nivin, P.C. By Joseph H. Nivin, Esq. I. Introduction In child custody proceedings, New York courts are charged with making critical, and emotional, choices about children’s lives. These choices include where a child will live, who will make decisions about a child’s medical and academic needs, and the level of access that the non-custodial parent will have to his or her own child. The standard for child custody determinations is highly subjective; N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §240(1)(a) provides that courts “shall enter orders for custody. . .as, in the court’s discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child” (The only restriction provided by the statute is that no court shall make an order providing for visitation or custody to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree, or of an offense in a foreign jurisdiction which would constitute said crimes in New York, where the victim was a parent, legal custodian, legal guardian, sibling, half-sibling or step-sibling of a child who is the subject of the proceeding. N.Y. DRL §240(1)(a)(1-c).) Allegations of parental alienation make the task even more difficult for New York’s jurists. Is the child a victim of abuse, or is one parent fabricating allegations to force the other parent out of the child’s life? Does the child have valid reasons to oppose any contact with the non-custodial parent, or is the opposition borne of manipulation by the custodial parent? This article explores the means by which New York courts analyze these important and emotional questions. Specifically, this article will explore: (1) the definitions of parental alienation, (2) the sets of facts that courts use to conclude that parental alienation exists, (3) the remedies after courts enter findings of parental alienation, and (4) the role of the attorney for the child. II. Defining Parental Alienation A. Dr. Richard Gardner, and “Parental Alienation Syndrome” Psychiatrist Richard Gardner defined Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) as: The programming of the child by one parent, into a campaign of denigration directed against the other. And the second component is the child’s own contributions that dovetail and complement the contributions of the programming parent. People v. Fortin, 184 Misc.2d 10, 12 (N.Y. Country CT.2000). In other words, Dr. Gardner defined PAS as a disorder where: (1) a parent programmed a child to denigrate the other parent, and (2) the child contributed to that denigration, complementing the efforts of the programming parent. PAS is not recognized as a valid medical syndrome by the American Medical Association, or the American Psychological Association. In addition, PAS is not listed in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Dallas, S.J. (1999). “Parental Alienation Syndrome: Is it scientific?” In E. St. Charles & L. Crook (Eds.), Expose: The failure of family courts to protect children from abuse in custody disputes. Los Gatos, CA: Our Children Our Children Charitable Foundation. New York courts have disallowed expert testimony regarding PAS, holding that the evidence was insufficient in those cases to establish that PAS is generally accepted in the relevant scientific communities. People v. Fortin, 289 A.D.2d 590 (2d Dep’t 2001); People v. Loomis, 172 Misc.2d 265 (1997). PAS is highly controversial, as the American Psychiatric Association (APA) considers its addition to the DSM-V in May 2013. Lithwick, Dahlia. “Mommy Hates Daddy, and You Should Too.” Slate.com, May 17, 2011. The National Organization for Women (NOW) advocates against the inclusion of PAS in the DSM-V, or its consideration in custody cases. Letter from Terry O’Neill, NOW President, to the Chair and Members of the Childhood and Adolescent Disorders Work Group of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), dated April 13, 2010. See also Weiser, Irene. “The Truth About Parental Alienation.” Stopfamilyviolence.org, February 23, 2007. In a letter to the Childhood and Adolescent Disorders Work Group of the APA, the President of NOW, Terry O’Neill, argued that abusive parents use allegations of parental alienation to discredit parents who are trying to protect their children from further abuse. Letter from Terry O’Neill to the Chair and Members of the Childhood and Adolescent Disorders Work Group of the APA, dated April 13, 2010. She also stated that PAS fails scientific muster, as it was not subjected to empirical studies or peer review. See id. Furthermore, Ms. O’Neill said that acceptance of PAS would allow perpetrators of domestic violence to argue that their victims’ responses are pathological. Ms. O’Neill asserted that legitimizing PAS could even help abusive parents to gain custody of their children. Id. Dr. William Bernet, M.D., is the leading voice supporting inclusion of Parental Alienation Disorder (PAD), or Parental Alienation Relational Problem (PARP) in the DSM-V. Bernet, William, von Boch-Galhau, Wilfrid, Baker, Amy J. L. and Morrison, Stephen L. (2010) ‘Parental Alienation, DSM-V, and ICD-11’, The American Journal of Family Therapy, 38: 2, 76-187. Dr. Bernet proposes using diagnostic criteria based partially upon PAS as the criteria to diagnose PAD or PARP. The proposed criteria for PAD are as follows, as stated in Appendix A of the Bernet article: A. The child – usually one whose parents are engaged in a hostile divorce – allies himself or herself strongly with one parent and rejects a relationship with the other, alienated parent without legitimate justification. The child resists or refuses visitation or parenting time with the alienated parent.B. The child manifests the following behaviors: (1) a persistent rejection or denigration of a parent that reaches the level of a campaign (2) weak, frivolous, and absurd rationalizations for the child’s persistent criticism of the rejected parent. C. The child manifests two of the following six attitudes and behaviors: a. Lack of ambivalence b. Independent-thinker phenomenon c. Reflexive support of one parent against the other d. Absence of guilt over exploitation of the rejected parent e. Presence of borrowed scenarios f. Spread of the animosity to the extended family of the rejected parent. D. The duration of the disturbance is at least 2 months. E. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, academic (occupational), or other important areas of functioning. F. The child’s refusal to have visitation with the rejected parent is without legitimate justification. That is, parental alienation disorder is not diagnosed if the rejected parent maltreated the child. Dr. Bernet argues that inclusion of such disorders in the DSM-V would enable better study and treatment of parental alienation. He also asserts that inclusion would prevent abusive parents and unethical attorneys from misusing parental alienation in custody disputes. Bernet, William , von Boch-Galhau, Wilfrid, Baker, Amy J. L. and Morrison, Stephen L. (2010) ‘Parental Alienation, DSM-V, and ICD-11’, The American Journal of Family Therapy, 38: 2, 82. Joseph E. Cordell, Esq., Principal Partner of Cordell & Cordell, also argues that some parents seek orders of protection, based upon abuse allegations, as “tactical nuclear weapons” in their divorce cases. Mr. Cordell says that these parents make abuse allegations in order to gain exclusive possession of the marital home, and sole custody of the children, by obtaining orders of protection against the other parent. Cordell, Joseph E. “Order of Protection: And Justice For All?” Huffington Post, September 23, 2011. At present, the general consensus among jurists is that PAS is not generally accepted in the scientific community, and is therefore inadmissible in court proceedings. Fortin, 289 A.D.2d 590; Loomis, 172 Misc.2d 265. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends that courts deny applications by litigants to introduce expert testimony regarding PAS. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. “Navigating Custody & Visitation Evaluations in Cases with Domestic Violence: A Judge’s Guide.” (2006) p. 24. B. The facts-based inquiry regarding parental alienation Courts generally engage in an intensive, facts-based inquiry to determine the legitimacy of allegations of parental alienation, without mentioning PAS. Parental alienation encompasses a wide variety of behaviors used by one parent to interfere with the other parent’s relationship with their child-in-common. Courts often find parental alienation where a parent disparages the other parent to, or in the presence of, the children. Anthony MM v. Jacquelyn NN, 91 A.D.3d 1036, 1037 (3d Dep’t 2012); Lovitch v. Lovitch, 64 A.D.3d 710, 712 (2d Dep’t 2009); Usack v. Usack, 17 A.D.3d 736, 738-39 (3d Dep’t 2005); Young v. Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 116 (2d Dep’t 1995); Lauren R. v. Ted R.., 27 Misc.3d 1227A (2010); SMB v. DRB, 17 Misc.3d 1132A (2007). Another ground for a finding of parental alienation is interference with the non-custodial parent’s visitation. Jones v. Leppert, 75 A.D.3d 552, 553 (2d Dep’t 2010); Lovitch, 64 A.D.3d at 712; Usack, 17 A.D.3d at 738-39; Kershaw v. Kershaw, 268 A.D.2d 829, 830 (3d Dep’t 2000); Lauren R.., 27 Misc.3d at 1227A; SMB, 17 Misc.3d at 1132A. Further grounds include relocation with the child or children, without consent or a court order, Ortega-Bejar v. Morante, 81 A.D.3d 962, 962 (2d Dep’t 2011), and discussion of the case with the child or children. T.F. v. F., 148 A.D.2d 449, 451 (2d Dep’t 1989). A common ground for a finding of parental alienation is fabrication of abuse or neglect allegations against the other parent. See Anthony MM, 91 A.D.3d at 1037; Martinez v. Hyatt, 86 A.D.3d 571, 571 (2d Dep’t 2011); Sloand v. Sloand, 30 A.D.3d 784, 785-86 (2d Dep’t 2006); Amanda B. v. Anthony B., 13 A.D.3d 1126, 1127 (4th Dep’t 2004); Young, 212 A.D.2d at 116; Lauren R.., 27 Misc.3d at 1227A. Where one parent accuses the other of abuse or neglect against a child-in-common, this creates a volatile situation for jurists presiding over custody cases. C. The precarious situation where a parent reports abuse or neglect by the other parent A difficult situation arises where a parent discovers evidence that the other parent is abusing or neglecting their child-in-common. Aside from the inherently painful nature of the situation, the parent must make a difficult choice about how to proceed in court. A parent has a legal responsibility to protect a child from abuse or neglect from the other parent. If a parent fails to fulfill that duty, the court can find that the parent abused or neglected the child, by failing to protect the child from the abuse or neglect. N.Y. Family Court Act §§1012(e) and (f); The Matter of Karen BB and Another, 216 A.D.2d 754 (3d Dep’t 1995); The Matter of Alan G., 185 A.D.2d 319 (2d Dep’t 1992); The Matter of Beverly WW, 159 A.D.2d 802 (3d Dep’t 1990); The Matter of Glenn G. and Another, 154 Misc.2d 677, 688 (1992). In contrast, if a custodial parent manufactures allegations that the non-custodial parent abused or neglected the child, the court may change custody based upon parental alienation. Anthony MM, 91 A.D.2d at 1037-38; Martinez, 86 A.D.3d at 571; Sloand, 30 A.D.3d at 785-86; Amanda B., 13 A.D.3d at 1127-28; Young, 212 A.D.2d at 116; Lauren R., 27 Misc.3d at 1227A. Where a custodial parent accuses a non-custodial parent of abuse or neglect, the non-custodial parent’s defense will generally be that the custodial parent manufactured the allegations in order to alienate the child or children. Therefore, where a custodial parent seeks judicial intervention to protect a child from the other parent, there lies a danger that the court will credit the non-custodial parent’s version, and change custody. On the other hand, if the custodial parent fails to act against an allegedly abusive or neglectful non-custodial parent, the custodial parent faces the danger of a judicial finding that such inaction itself constituted child abuse or neglect. D. “Bridget’s Law” To assist parents seeking to protect their children, in 2008, Governor Paterson signed “Bridget’s Law,” which provides that: If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent shall not be deprived of custody, visitation or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation, or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief. N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §240(1)(a). See also Stashenko, Joel. “New Law Shields ‘Good Faith’ Abuse Accuser in Custody Cases.” New York Law Journal. September 9, 2008, p. 1. In theory, the law addresses the predicament that a custodial parent faces when confronted with evidence that the non-custodial parent’s behavior endangers the child. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the law will result in a drastic change. In order to be protected by Bridget’s Law, the court must find that the accuser-parent acted in good faith. Because the parents likely had a tumultuous relationship prior to the accusations of abuse or neglect, the accused parent will almost invariably contend that the other parent acted in bad faith. The accuser-parent will face the same possibility that the court credits the other parent’s version, and suffer the same consequences as a result. III. Remedies after a finding of parental alienation After a court enters a finding of parental alienation by a custodial parent, a common remedy is for the court to change custody. Anthony MM, 91 A.D.3d at 1038; Martinez, 86 A.D.3d at 572; Ortega-Bejar, 81 A.D.3d at 963-64; Jonex, 75 A.D.3d at 553; Lovitch, 64 A.D.3d at 711; Frey v. Ketcham, 57 A.D.3d 543, 543-44 (2d Dep’t 2008); Sloand, 30 A.D.3d at 784, 785-86; A manda B., 13 A.D.3d at 1127; Bobinski, 9 A.D.3d at 441-42; Young, 212 A.D.2d at 125. A change of custody should not be issued “solely as a means for punishing a recalcitrant parent.” Lauren R., 27 Misc.3d at 1227A. However, parental alienation is an act considered inconsistent with the best interests of the child, which raises a “strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent.” Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 115. The court may also issue an order that the offending party receive supervised visitation, and participate in therapy. Zafran v. Zafran, 28 A.D.3d 753, 754 and 756 (2d Dep’t 2006). Where the court finds that the custodial parent is responsible for alienating the child from the non-custodial parent, the court may, short of changing custody, award expanded visitation to the non-custodial parent. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 68 A.D.3d 717, 720 (2d Dep’t 2009). Where a court finds that a custodial parent has wrongfully interfered with or withheld visitation provided by a court order, the court may suspend alimony or maintenance, or cancel arrears that accrued during the time that visitation was being interfered with or withheld. N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §241. However, interference with visitation cannot serve as a defense in an application to enforce payment of child support, and cannot constitute grounds for cancellation of child support arrears. Id. While parental alienation cannot serve as a ground to cancel child support obligations retroactively, courts have suspended child support obligations prospectively, upon a finding that the custodial parent deliberately interfered with the relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent. Colicci v. Ruhm, 20 A.D.3d 891, 891-92 (4th Dep’t 2005); Usack v. Usack, 17 A.D.3d 736, 737-38 and 739-40 (3d Dep’t 2005); Hiross v. Hiross, 224 A.D.2d 662, 663 (2d Dep’t 1996); S MB, 17 Misc.3d at 1132A. In The Matter of F.S.-P. v. A.H.R., Nassau County Family Court held that a non-custodial parent can invoke parental alienation as a defense where the custodial parent seeks an initial child support order. 17 Misc.3d 390, 393 (2007). A parent who seeks suspension of child support based upon parental alienation must demonstrate that the custodial parent deliberately interfered with the parent-child relationship. Foster v. Daigle, 25 A.D.3d 1002, 1004 (3d Dep’t 2006); Hiross, 224 A.D.2d at 663. Furthermore, the Court cannot impose this remedy if the record establishes a danger that the child will become a public charge as a result. Usack, 17 A.D.3d at 739; SMB, 17 Misc.3d at 1132A. Other remedies for parental alienation include criminal liability for custodial interference (N.Y. Penal Law §§135.45 and 135.50), a tort action for custodial interference, and orders of protection. N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §240, Lauren R., 27 Misc.3d at 1227A. Where the court finds that acts of parental alienation violate prior court orders, the court may also incarcerate the offending party. N.Y. Judiciary Law §§750 and 753; see also Lauren R., 27 Misc.3d at 1227A. IV. The Role of the Attorney for the Child In child custody proceedings, New York State courts have the authority to appoint attorneys to represent children “when, in the opinion of the family court judge, such representation will serve the purposes of this act, if independent legal counsel is not available to the child.” N.Y. Family Court Act §249(a). On October 17, 2007, the Chief Judge of the State of New York Judith S. Kaye issued Rule 7.2, entitled, “Function of the attorney for the child.” Rule §7.2(d)(2) provides, in relevant part: he attorney for the child must zealously advocate the child’s position. . .If the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the attorney for the child should be directed by the wishes of the child, even if the attorney for the child believes that what the child wants is not in the child’s best interests. The attorney should explain fully the options available to the child, and may recommend to the child a course of action that in the attorney’s view would best promote the child’s interests. If a parent successfully alienates a child from the other parent, it is clear that the child will wish to have a minimal relationship, or even no relationship, with the alienated parent. Therefore, under the Rules of the Chief Judge, it is likely that an attorney for the child will have to advocate for the court to issue as little parenting time as possible for the alienated parent. Family Court practitioners are aware that the position of the attorney for the child often carries significant weight. The requirement for direct advocacy by the attorney for the child may cause frustration among litigants who assert that the opposing party has alienated the children. As Rule 7.2 becomes more established, the bar should expect to see appellate cases, where aggrieved parents argue that courts gave undue weight to children’s attorneys who advocated the wishes of alienated children. V. Conclusion One could hardly think of a more important task for a judge than the task of deciding which parent should have custody of a child. Allegations of parental alienation make the task even more difficult. Presently, the American Psychiatric Association is deciding whether parental alienation should constitute a disorder in the DSM-V. Is parental alienation a tool for abusive parents to obtain custody or their children, or is it a syndrome which merits scientific study, and treatment for its child victims? The APA’s decision will have critical consequences for the Family Court, and for the scores of children whose futures depend upon the decisions of Family Court judges. Regardless of whether parental alienation is a mental disorder, courts constantly face allegations that litigants are engaging in behaviors designed to interfere with parent-child relationships. These same courts must then decide whether parental alienation exists, or whether the party asserting alienation is an abusive parent. These choices, based upon conflicting testimony and subjective determinations, make or break the lives of innocent children, who find themselves in the middle of a conflict between the two most important people in their lives. Recent developments in the role of the attorney for the child complicate parental alienation cases. As attorneys for children advocate the wishes of their child-clients, alienated parents find themselves feeling more frustrated in their battles to maintain relationships with their children. Parental alienation cases feature the most desperate litigants: parents willing to falsely accuse the other parent of child abuse, and abusive parents who try to bury the other parent for protecting the child. The devastating consequences of parental alienation cases remind members of the bar of the importance of serving as counselors, as well as advocates. If we successfully counsel our clients to put the children’s best interests at the forefront, we can make an immeasurable impact upon the lives of the children who depend upon the Family Court.

Decreased Visitation Does Not Mean Increased Child Support

On Behalf of The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nivin, P.C. Casler v Casler 2015 NY Slip Op 06653 Decided on August 26, 2015 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Decided on August 26, 2015 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P. JOHN M. LEVENTHAL SHERI S. ROMAN ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ. 2013-09796 (Index No. 12567/97) Diane Casler, appellant, v Carl Casler, respondent. Diane Pizzolo, named herein as Diane Casler, Cortlandt Manor, N.Y., appellant pro se. Bodnar & Milone LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Erik Kristensen of counsel), for respondent. DECISION & ORDER Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colleen D. Duffy, J.), dated August 9, 2013. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendant in contempt for his failure to provide her with proof of his procurement of life insurance naming the parties’ child as an irrevocable beneficiary, for an upward modification of the defendant’s child support obligation, and for an award of an attorney’s fee. ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. The defendant’s child support obligation was set forth in a stipulation dated January 19, 1998, which was incorporated but not merged into the parties’ judgment of divorce. Since the stipulation was executed prior to the effective date of the 2010 amendments to Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b)(2) ( see L 2010, ch 182, § 13), in order to establish her entitlement to an upward modification of the defendant’s child support obligation, the plaintiff had the burden of establishing a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances resulting in a concomitant need, or that the agreement was not fair and equitable when entered into ( see Gribbin v Gribbin, 126 AD3d 938, 939; DelGaudio v DelGaudio, 126 AD3d 848, 849; Matter of Gadalinska v Ahmed, 120 AD3d 1232, 1233; Matter of Dimaio v Dimaio, 111 AD3d 933, 933; see also Kaplan v Kaplan, 130 AD3d 576; Zaratzian v Abadir, 128 AD3d 953; Matter of Corbisiero v Corbisiero, 112 AD3d 625, 626). As relevant here, the plaintiff did not establish that the reduction in the defendant’s visitation with the child constituted a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances that created the need for modification of his child support obligation (cf. Matter of Gravlin v Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 3-6; Matter of McCormick v McCormick, 97 AD3d 682). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for an upward modification of the defendant’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the parties’ stipulation, which required the defendant to show that he was maintaining a $200,000 life insurance policy naming the parties’ child as an irrevocable beneficiary. To prevail on a motion to hold a party in civil contempt, the movant is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) that the order was disobeyed and the party disobeying the order had knowledge of its terms, and (3) that the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct ( see Halioris v Halioris, 126 AD3d 973; El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d 4, 16; Bernard-Cadet v Gobin, 94 AD3d 1030, 1031). Here, the plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing all of the aforementioned elements of civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, she failed to show any prejudice she suffered as a result of the defendant’s failure to provide the documentation she requested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly declined to hold the defendant in civil contempt for disobeying this provision of the stipulation. The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request for an award of an attorney’s fee ( see Freight Brokers Global Servs., Inc. v Molfetta, 90 AD3d 828, 828-829). The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. MASTRO, J.P., LEVENTHAL, ROMAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. ENTER: Aprilanne Agostino Clerk of the Court